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Revivino Local Tribal Conftrol
ini Inian Courntry
Progressive tribes, states, and local governments tra-
verse the jurisdictional wasteland of Indian country by
negotiating their conflicts into intergovernmental agree-
ments. Reticent states and local governments have
sought refuge in the federal courts because the
Supreme Court's Indian cases tend to value state inter-
ests over tribal interests, despite the fact that Congress
chose to restore local control of Indian country to
Indian tribes in passing the Indian Reorganization Act
and the various Self-Determination Acts. The successes
of public safety, taxation, environmental, and commer-
cial intergovernmental cooperation should not be so
underestimated.
By Ma thew L.M. FletcherLegal scholars have long debated centralized, region-
alized, and localized government, but none have
done so with the 562 federally recognized Indian
tribes in mind. Indian tribes range in demographic and ter-
ritorial size from larger than some Eastern states to smaller
than the Vatican, but the tribes are all sovereign entities
with the authority to govern themselves. Indian tribes, as
sovereigns vested with inherent authority, operate on nu-
merous levels analogous to national, state, and local gov-
ernments. For example, Indian tribes administer federal
government programs under the various self-determination
acts, negotiate compacts with state governments, engage
in multimillion-dollar business activities, and regulate mu-
nicipal activities such as garbage. pickup and snow-plow-
ing roads. No other level of American government handles
such a broad array of services and issues. On any given
month, tribal officials and professionals might testify be-
fore Congress, negotiate a tax agreement with a state treas-
urer, and conclude a local law enforcement cross-deputi-
zation agreement with a local county police commission.
Indian tribes retain the sovereign authority necessary to
provide for local self-government, a remnant of the feder-
al government's policy of "measured separatism" that was
in effect during the treaty era. Today, express congres-
sional and executive branch policies favor tribal self-de-
termination. Despite this support from the federal policy-
making branches of government, Indian tribes face obsta-
cles in exercising governmental authority. Although Indi-
an tribal governments continue to acquire greater capacity
to govern and to serve their constituencies, the Supreme
Court is more wary of allowing the enforcement of tribal
law against nonmembers. The Court has noted concerns
about the lack of consent to being governed by tribal
governments within which nonmembers might have little
or no right to political participation; T. Alexander
Aleinikoff has referred to this as a "democratic deficit.'1
Moreover, the Court implied that the "checkerboarding" of
jurisdiction within Indian country leads it to conclude that
the most pragmatic way to resolve jurisdictional disputes
is to extend state jurisdiction to tribal lands. As a result,
state and local governments - and their non-Indian con-
stituents - are the "favored quarter," to borrow a real es-
tate term. Federal courts have upheld these interests over
the interests of Indian tribes in a large majority of the cas-
es. In December 2005, the Supreme Court decided in fa-
vor of the state of Kansas and ruled that it may tax a non-
Indian fuel distributor whose fuel was to be sold by an
on-reservation gas station owned by the Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, even where the tax would be paid
downstream by the nation.
In the midst of the ruins of federal Indian law, inter-
governmental negotiation and agreements have arisen.
More and more states, local governments, and Indian
tribes are sitting down to discuss their differences, often
reaching unique and farsighted solutions. In the last few
years alone, Indian tribes in Michigan have concluded
agreements with the state of Michigan over economic de-
velopment and shared water resources. Intergovernmental
agreements also cross national borders; for instance, Indi-
an tribes from the United States and the First Nations from
Canada executed the Tribal and First Nations Great Lakes
Water Accord on Nov. 23, 2004. As state and local and
tribal officials learn to communicate and to cooperate
with each other, the opportunities for negotiating agree-
ments that head off jurisdictional and political disputes in-
crease. As a result, one successful agreement leads to
more successful agreements. State and local government
and tribal executives have the best view of their own
needs in these numerous and disparate areas and can
reach the best solutions - far better than the judiciary or
even legislatures can reach.
This article argues that working with non-Indian govern-
ments to build cooperation will allow Indian tribes to ex-
pand their ability to self-govern, while meeting the needs
of non-Indian governments that are frustrated by the limit-
ed application of state law in Indian country. Intergovern-
mental agreement - a pillar of a strategy championed by
those who advocate tearing down the "tyranny of the fa-
vored quarter" in metropolitan areas 2 - offers enormous
potential to improve the efficient provision of local and re-
gional governmental services, to preserve and expand the
authority of tribal governments, and to reduce the concerns
of non-Indians that they might be subject to a tribal gov-
ernment that enacts laws that are, according to Justice
Souter, "unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out."'3
Federal Indian Law and the Decline of
Tribal Bargaining Power
The jurisprudence of federal Indian law in the modern
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The Rochester Panel, Utah. Photo by Lawrence R. Baca.
era has done little to resolve long-term disputes between
Indian tribes, nonmembers, and state and local govern-
ments, but it has done even less to pave the way toward
finding long-term solutions for all disputes in this field.
Philip Frickey has suggested that the Supreme Court's atti-
tude is that "Congress has failed to step in and fix a myri-
ad of festering local problems by eliminating tribal author-
ity." 4 As a result, the Court is left to "jerry-rig a ruthlessly
pragmatic blend of federal Indian law with 'general Ameri-
can law." The Court's solutions to disputes between tribes
and state governments are ad hoc, with little or no regard
for the future. For example, the underlying taxation dis-
pute in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation arose
after the state of Kansas refused to renew an intergovern-
mental tax agreement. 5 In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg re-
minded the Court that entering into intergovernmental
agreements was "the most beneficial means to resolve
conflicts of this order." Tipping the scales toward the in-
terests of the state governments, according to Justice
Ginsburg, "casts ... a cloud" over the potential of inter-
governmental agreements to resolve disputes between
tribes and state governments.
States have less reason to negotiate with tribes if they
believe the Court values their interests over tribal interests
as a preliminary matter. In fact, Indian tribes and tribal
members complained that state officers behaved in a cav-
alier fashion in Indian Country after the Court's decision
in Nevada v. Hicks, which held that tribal courts had no
jurisdiction over state officials. After state officers raided a
smoke shop that was located on tribal trust land and was
owned and operated by the Narragansett Indian Tribe,
Professor Robert N. Clinton has noted that "[wihat the
Court is doing is creating a climate which gave the Rhode
Island officials the belief that they could do what they
did, which is not a healthy development. '6 It is in cases
like these that the tyranny of the favored quarter arises,
whereby states and local governments have greater bar-
gaining power over their tribal government neighbors.
"(6eckerboard" Jurisdictions
The Court's entrance into the field of making federal
policy in Indian law has both cemented and worsened the
condition known as "checkerboard" jurisdiction. Territorial
boundaries between Indian tribes and state and local gov-
ernments are critical to maintaining jurisdictional consis-
tency and comprehension. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Worcester v. Georgia - one of the landmark
"Cherokee cases" - that state law has "no force" within
Indian country, clear territorial lines between state and
tribal authority have become critical. 7 For many tribes, the
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line between state territory and Indian country often was
apparent: in many instances, Indian country consisted of
reservations created by treaty that included detailed legal
descriptions of where the reservation began and ended.
This was consistent with a critical purpose of many early
treaties - what Charles Wilkinson called "measured sepa-
ratism."8 On occasion, the U.S. military guarded the reser-
vation's boundaries, placing fences on the border to keep
non-Indians out while keeping the Indians in.
The boundaries of reservations were not always well
preserved. The dispossession of Indian lands began long
ago, blurring the territorial boundaries necessary to main-
tain efficient jurisdictional lines. This history included
non-Indian trespassers squatting on Indian lands, non-In-
dians and their government agents defrauding Indians out
of their lands, and using dozens of other illegal methods
to take Indian lands. The "allotment era," which began as
express congressional policy in 1887, opened up Indian
lands for settlement, resulting in the diminishment or
even disestablishment of Indian reservations. Indian land-
holdings declined by 90 million acres during the era of al-
lotment. In many reservations, Indians became demo-
graphic minorities within their own lands, in terms of
both population and land ownership.
Allotment led to the major portion of the checkerboard
pattern of land ownership and territory in Indian country.
The dispossession of Indian lands occurred in piecemeal
fashion. Some land parcels remained in the hands of Indi-
ans or tribal governments, while others were transferred
to non-Indians and non-Indian governments. Jurisdiction-
al morass was inevitable, as were disputes over regulatory
and adjudicatory authority. As Justice Blackmun argued in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima In-
dian Nation, which cemented the checkerboarding of the
Yakima Indian reservations, "This, in practice, will be
nothing short of a nightmare, nullifying the efforts of both
sovereigns to segregate incompatible land uses and exac-
erbating the already considerable tensions that exist be-
tween local and tribal governments in many parts of the
[nlation about the best use of reservation lands."9
In acting as a policy-maker, the Supreme Court has
also intervened in areas once considered internal tribal af-
fairs - the governance of all peoples located within Indi-
an country by Indian tribes. The Court, in particular, has
limited the authority of Indian tribes to regulate the activi-
ties of nonmembers, either in terms of criminal law or civ-
il regulatory law. At the same time, the Court has curtailed
the authority of tribal courts to hear civil cases in which a
nonmember is a defendant.
The So-Called Democratic Deficit
Aleinikoff has argued that, "[i]f there is an organized
principle that dominates the legal landscape [of federal In-
dian law] today, it is the concept of membership." Alex
Tallchief Skibine agrees, noting that "the Court's general
focus on protecting individual rights, its concern that such
rights are not considered or protected by the Congress, as
well as its belief that such rights would not be protected
by the tribes since non-members cannot vote in tribal
elections."10 Both scholars identify Duro v. Reina as a
case in which the Court expressed this concern.11 In that
case, the Court wrote that it would "hesitate" to permit
nonmember Indians to be prosecuted by "political bodies
that do not include them." Aleinikoff concludes that the
Court appears to rely on the fact that tribal membership is
consensual.
Justice Kennedy's views most exemplify this point. As
he stated in a September 2005 New Yorker interview, "We
have a legal identity; and our self-definition as a nation is
bound up with the Constitution. ... There is also the con-
stitution with a small 'c,' the sum total of customs and
mores of the community. ... The closer the big 'C' and
the small 'c,' the better off you are as a society." The
question of where Indian tribes, which are "extraconstitu-
tional" entities, fit into the notion of the "big C" and the
"small c" appears to trouble the Court. Justice Kennedy,
in particular, subscribes to the view that nonmembers
never consented to tribal government authority in the
same way that they consented to the authority of the
state and federal government. 12 Philip Frickey has sug-
gested that Justice Kennedy's solution would be to "bring
[American] civil religion to Indian country" - or, in other
words, to bring state and local government law and juris-
diction to Indian lands. In fact, the Court asserted in re-
cent dicta in Nevada v. Hicks that there is a presumption
that state law applies in Indian country. However, the
Court is also confounded by these issues; as Joseph
Singer has argued, "Much as the Court would like to limit
sovereignty entirely, it is neither equipped nor inclined to
erase tribal sovereignty entirely." 13
The so-called democratic deficit problem is an illusion.
To borrow an old analogy, a resident and citizen of Col-
orado who defaults on a loan in Utah may be subject to
the legal processes of Utah, even though he or she is not
a citizen of that state. The Court focuses on the possibility
that the Colorado resident has legal status sufficient to
some day acquire citizenship in Utah, in contrast to a
non-Indian, who might not .have that status. But at the
time the Colorado citizen's loan is adjudicated, the person
is not a citizen of Utah. Moreover, should the Colorado
citizen move to Utah and become a citizen of Utah, the
change in status could not alter the result of the Utah
courts' adjudication of the loan at issue.
The Tyranny of the Favored Quarter in
Tribal-State Relations
Perhaps the most fitting example of what has been
called the tyranny of the favored quarter in tribal-state re-
lations is the Yaqui village of Guadalupe, located well
within the metropolitan areas of southwestern Phoenix
and surrounded by wealthy suburbs of Mesa, Tempe, and
Chandler, Arizona. The Yaqui residents of Guadalupe are
poor and often require governmental assistance for their
housing, health care, and jobs, even though elite country
clubs, golf courses, and shopping centers are located less
than a mile away from the village. Despite the tribe's
poverty, when the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona pur-
chased land in Guadalupe for the purpose of developing
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housing for needy tribal members, major newspapers
published false allegations that the tribe had purchased
the land in hopes of opening another casino. The com-
munity has since received federal funding for a new hous-
ing project conditioned on voters' approval of a local
property tax exemption. However, opposition from mem-
bers of Arizona's congressional delegation, in part gener-
ated by fears of an Indian gaming enterprise, makes it un-
likely that the tribe will be able to take its land in
Guadalupe into trust.
It is in cases such as these that the contours of federal
Indian law as articulated by the Supreme Court began to
assist state and local governments in their desire to con-
trol Indian country. Much of federal Indian law jurispru-
dence, unlike most other fields, has been created by the
Supreme Court, which then uses that jurisprudence to rein
in tribal exercises of inherent authority. As Chief Justice
Marshall stated in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court keeps in
mind "the actual state of things," not federal Indian policy
as expressed by Congress and the executive branch. The
Court, in effect, makes policy for itself. When it comes to
federal Indian law, the Supreme Court is by far the busiest
policy-maker of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment. Given the relative conservatism of the Court as an
institution and of the members of the Court, Indian tribes
are not favored parties in its rulings.
There are two fronts on which the Supreme Court has
elevated state and local governments and non-Indians
over tribal governments. First, the Court tends to vote in
favor of state and local government authorities when
those authorities conflict or compete with the authority of
tribal governments. This is not surprising, given the Rehn-
quist Court's tendency to rule in favor of states rights in
other areas, such as cases involving the Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Court's re-
cent dicta that there is a presumption that state law now
applies within Indian country is an unspoken reversal of
previous Supreme Court precedent, relying on the much-
criticized 1958 version of Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law. 14 Congress has sometimes passed
legislation in this area, for example, when it extended
state courts' criminal and civil jurisdiction to Indian coun-
try enclaves in certain states, but it has never extended
state law to Indian reservations in a pronouncement as
broad as the one made by the Supreme Court.
The second front on which the Supreme Court has
shown its predilection to favor state and local govern-
ments was revealed in very first Indian case the Court
heard -Johnson v. M'Intosh - in which the Court intro-
duced an unusual constitutional doctrine known as "im-
plicit divestiture." 15 In Johnson, the Court held that Indian
tribes, by virtue of the mere presence of non-Indian sov-
ereigns in the area, no longer had the authority to transfer
the rights to their lands to anyone except the sovereign,
which in that case was the United States. For decades, the
Court had refrained from expanding the areas of tribal
sovereign authority that had been implicitly divested, but
in more recent cases, the Court has held that Indian tribes
have been implicitly divested of authority to prosecute
nonmembers, most of their authority to tax nonmembers,
and most of their authority to assume civil adjudicatory ju-
risdiction over nonmembers. Without congressional ap-
proval or tribal consent, the Court has asserted the au-
thority to divest numerous and fundamental sovereign
powers of Indian tribes.
With the Court's unprecedented detour into national
policy-making in the guise of federal Indian law, the
Court has created a "favored quarter" by elevating state
and local governments above tribal governments in al-
most every area of conflict or competition. As a general
matter of national demographics and political fact, Indian
country does not receive funding for public infrastructure
projects that neighboring states and local communities re-
ceive; and much of Indian country does not have a tax
base or a source of stable governmental revenues. As a
result, state and local governments have local powers
over Indian reservations sufficient to force Indian tribes
into a state of weakness and dependence.
All these factors generate increasing disputes between
Indian tribes, nonmembers, and state and local govern-
ments; and the areas of conflict are as diverse as the activ-
ities in which each government engages. As part of the
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Develop-
ment, Stephen Cornell and Jonathan Taylor have noted
that states and Indian tribes "have locked horns over haz-
ardous and nuclear waste, wildlife management, foster
care, off-reservation fishing, gaming compacts, taxation of
all kinds, auto licensing, policing, and other issues - in
sum, over nearly every facet of tribal life."'16 These con-
flicts tend to result in litigation in federal court.
When the federal judiciary decides these conflicts, its
decisions cut with a blunt instrument, relying on a relative
lack of relevant precedential authority. The precedent the
Supreme Court generates in one discrete dispute applies
to all state governments and Indian tribes, restricting other
governments' ability to negotiate on a blank slate. And
even though the Court seems to acknowledge that its de-
cisions in the Indian cases have created legal gray areas
that are rife with dispute, some justices have implied that
"the Court, not Congress, should have the final say about
some matters."
17
Moreover, the expansion of state authority into Indian
country, coupled with the diminishment of recognized
tribal authority, has created inefficiencies - and some-
times a void - in the provision of government services to
both Indians and non-Indians residing on or near Indian
country. For the most part, state and local governments
often have no interest in expanding their provision of
governmental services to residents of Indian country.
Moreover, the jurisdictional morass of federal Indian law
discourages state and local governments from even ap-
proaching Indian country. The best historical example
that highlights these problems was the enactment and im-
plementation of Public Law 280,18 which authorized cer-
tain states to extend their civil and criminal jurisdiction
into Indian country. However, because Congress did not
provide any funds to assist the states in meeting the new
burdens on their governments, the result was increased
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jurisdictional confusion and inefficiency of government
activities across the board.
Now that, in some respects, the Supreme Court has be-
gun the process of expanding state and local government
authority into Indian Country, such problems loom large.
In some ways, state and local governments located near
Indian reservations are free riders, garnering the benefit
of tribal economic development through increased prop-
erty taxes and pinching tribal contractors off the reserva-
tion for taxes.
Local Tribal Control Favored b Congress
and the Executive Branch
In contrast to the Supreme Court's decisions, actions
taken by the federal policy-making branches of govern-
ment have long supported the tribe's local control over
reservation affairs. In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) in part to further tribal self-gov-
ernment and local tribal control. 19 Commentators have fo-
cused on the autocratic control exercised by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs over Indian people as a critical piece of
the legislative history. However, it does not appear that
Congress meant to wrest away control and authority over
Indian affairs from the federal government only to turn
everything over to the states. The legislative history sug-
gests that "the IRA sought to set up tribal governments for
the 'functional and tribal organization of the Indians so-as
to make the Indians the principal agents in their own eco-
nomic and racial salvation."' 20 The IRA did not diminish
the inherent local powers of Indian tribes that the Court
recognized in prior cases such as Talton v. Mayes.21 Local
control was a critical element of the purposes underlying
passage of the IRA.
On occasion, different Supreme Court opinions have
noted the importance of local control as found in the IRA
and in the inherent authority of tribal sovereigns. In Mor-
ton v. Mancari, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion quot-
ed a letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt endorsing
the IRA by lauding its intent to "extend to the Indian the
fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-gov-
ernment. ' 22 Moreover, the Court quoted legislative history
evidencing that the kind of services that the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs provides - services that Congress intended
Indian tribes to provide themselves - were "comparable
to local municipal and county services, since they are
dealing with purely local Indian problems." In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, quoted the language in Talton v. Mayes affirming
the inherent local authority of Indian tribes. 2 3 Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Brendale v. Confederat-
ed Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that Indian tribes,
as local governments, should have the authority to zone
reservation lands, a power fundamental for local govern-
mental authority.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Justice Marshall,
again writing for the majority, quoted the influential 1934
solicitor's opinion entitled Powers of Indian Tribes, which
stated that
Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a
landowner as well as the rights of a local govern-
ment, dominion as well as sovereignty. But over all
the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the
tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe
has the sovereign power of determining the condi-
tions upon which persons shall be permitted to en-
ter its domain, to reside therein, and to do business,
provided only such determination is consistent with
applicable [flederal laws and does not infringe any
vested rights of persons now occupying reservation
lands under lawful authority.24
The ruling in Merrion is perhaps the Court's strongest
statement that Indian tribes are not only the "domestic de-
pendent nations" they were labeled in Worcester, but also
the "local governments." Congressional acts following
passage of the IRA affirm that the intent and continued
policy of Congress - at least since 1970 - is to promote
and preserve local self-government of Indian tribes. Kevin
Washburn has proposed that, in the future, Indian tribes
should piggyback onto congressional legislation in other
areas, as they did in the mid-1990s with legislation relat-
ing to block grants for community development. 25
The Utility of Intergovernmental Negotia-
tion and Agreement
The Supreme Court is aware of the mess created by
the federal Indian law jurisprudence. In cases prior to its
decision in Wagnon, the Court noted that negotiation and
agreement between Indian tribes and state and local gov-
ernments might be an alternative to resolving disputes
through litigation. Unfortunately, it appears that states
such as Kansas and Rhode Island believe that tribal-state
relations are like a prisoner's dilemma, where trust and
respect are in short supply and cordial relations give way
to the notion that the first sovereign to blink loses every-
thing. However, other states, such as Michigan, and nu-
merous local jurisdictions deal with the local tribes with
an eye toward mutual advantage.
There are significant mutual advantages to intergovern-
mental compromise. The key advantages for Indian tribes
in entering into intergovernmental agreements are reduc-
ing or eliminating the uncertainty that federal Indian law
brings into every commercial transaction, every regulated
activity on public and private property, and most criminal
actions. Moreover, these agreements improve tribal sover-
eignty by allowing tribes to exercise a de facto form of
sovereignty over checkerboarded lands.26 The key advan-
tages for states and local governments that come from en-
tering into compacts with Indian tribes are the same. The
advantages to the members and residents of Indian coun-
try include more efficient and beneficial provision of gov-
ernmental services and improved business opportunities.
Intergovernmental agreements tend to reduce the con-
fusion and uncertainty of checkerboarded jurisdictional
maps by blending state and local jurisdiction lines with
Indian country lines. For example, the effect of intergov-
ernmental agreements related to law enforcement at the
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Flathead Indian Reservation has been to make a checker-
boarded reservation "almost a non-issue with governmen-
tal agencies."27 Another example is the "agreement area"
concept developed in the tax agreements reached be-
tween Michigan and Indian tribes, whereby any dispute
arising on lands in which the tribe and the state disagree
in Indian country will be treated as Indian country for
purposes of the agreement.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether a
state or local government can agree to bind its non-Indian
constituents to tribal civil regulatory or adjudicatory juris-
diction, but local citizens' political participation in local
government suggests that there would be a very strong ar-
gument in favor of it. Local government offers the oppor-
tunity for citizens to increase their political participation in
government. A negotiation between Indian tribes and local
governments resulting in an agreement reflecting the inter-
ests of both the tribe and the local government includes all
the elements necessary to meet and resolve the Court's
concerns. Nonmembers are represented by the local gov-
ernment, nonmembers may comment on the negotiation
and the agreement before final execution, and local resi-
dents may drive the negotiations in important ways. Final-
ly, because an agreement requires consent, local non-Indi-
ans have an opportunity to participate in negotiations be-
tween Indian tribes and local governments (and even
states). A local government, like a tribe, should be able to
enter into an agreement to which its residents will be
bound. Any concerns the Court has about political partici-
pation and consent should be allayed.
Political Barriers to Intergovernmental
Negotiations and Agreements
Despite the effort expended by Indian tribes and non-
Indian governments to negotiate and resolve intergovern-
mental disputes, the overall success of these attempts has
been slow. The long history of animosity and distrust be-
tween Indians and non-Indians continues to bar the door
to cooperation. According to some commentators, "the
adversarial perceptions held by federal, state, and tribal
governments have been pervasive in Indian/non-Indian
relations. '"28 For example, little progress has been made in
California, despite the presence of explicit authorization
from the California Assembly to enter into cooperative
agreements with Indian tribes on environmental issues. As
two researchers have stated, "Often, even if the state
agency or agency member wants to have a cooperative
relationship with the tribes, they may be forced into con-
frontation."29
Groups or individuals opposing tribal development use
California environmental laws against Indian tribes as "de
facto zoning laws to stop development." When a California
agency's non-Indian constituents use California law against
Indian tribes "like a sledgehammer," it becomes difficult for
agencies and Indian tribes to develop the trust and experi-
ence necessary to generate positive working relationships.
In Montana (and in Western states in general), researchers
have identified a "cowboy mentality" among non-Indian
property owners, accompanied by a political view that In-
dian tribes are not "legitimate" governing bodies. 30 Con-
stant adversarial relationships hinder - and sometimes
preclude - reaching intergovernmental agreements.
State and local governments may view Indian tribes as
competitors in a small economic market or for a small tax
base. For example, state and local governments objected
to a plan proposed by the Campo Band of Kumeyaay In-
dians to begin a landfill project, viewing them as competi-
tion in the area of solid waste management, until the tribe
promised that its revenues from the landfill would go to
tribal government programs and to tribal members only.
As Gloria Valencia-Weber wrote 10 years ago, many state
governments have attempted to "legitimate their state reg-
ulation, coupled with taxation, in an effort to change the
size and status of Indian lands so that state power can
overcome tribal governance." 3 1 And, according to Cornell
and Taylor, many states hold the view that the economic
development that Indian tribes create is equivalent to a
loss in tax and other revenues for states - a zero-sum
game. These states argue that these costs are "lost rev-
enues as tribes capture dollars from non-Indian vendors,
reduce state tax revenues, or otherwise move dollars into
tribal hands, or in increased state burdens as reservations
export pollution, social problems, or some other cost to
the surrounding region." States are also concerned about
the perception that tribal businesses have unfair competi-
tive advantages over Indian tribes. Some states argue that
approving tribal regulatory control enables tribes to force
a "race to the bottom," allowing for lax regulation that
will draw businesses into Indian country. 32
These barriers are political barriers, but they should
not stop Indian tribes and non-Indian governments from
negotiating and entering into agreements, because inter-
governmental agreements bring benefits for all parties.
Competition declines as cooperation improves.
Concluision
Justice Brandeis declared: "Denial of the right to exper-
iment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
[n]ation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."33
The United States is heading toward greater devolution
of governmental authority to state and local entities. This
trend will significantly transfer a great deal of decision-
making power from the federal government to the states.
Intergovernmental agreements can be more comprehen-
sive than litigation, providing a basis for avoiding future
disputes in a wide variety of areas relating to the provi-
sion of governmental services and allowing the parties to
pursue limited federal grants and funds in a cooperative
manner. In addition, there are advantages to intergovern-
mental negotiation and agreement for the sovereignty of
Indian tribes, because "any agreement - including even'
the agreement to talk - is an exercise of sovereignty." 34
Finally, in the words of Frank Pommersheim, "Both the
tribes and the states need to know that their greatest 'ene-
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mies' come from commercial and exploitative interests
outside the region. Each side has to see, or at least ex-
plore, the potential for identifying local common ground
on which to make a stand. ' 35 TFL
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